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GENDER AND THE CURRENT WARS OF GLOBALIZATION

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The collapse of the Soviet Union, the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe that ended communist rule in those countries, and the reunification of Germany marked the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War, however, did not usher in a new period of peace and stability around the world. Instead, more than two decades later since the emergence of this new globalized era in world politics, conflicts continue to afflict the international community in the form of both intrastate and interstate wars. At present, intrastate conflicts are occurring in twenty-three states, including Afghanistan, Colombia, Somalia, Syria and Yemen. Eight states have “recently ended” wars (i.e., U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq, Chad, Nigeria and Sri Lanka), but for many states, “political tensions and/or low level violence” remain.¹

A gender/feminist analysis provides an invaluable method of understanding the wars of globalization in the contemporary period. Feminist scholars remind us of the social construction of gender in which people are categorized into (hierarchical) binaries: men/women, masculine/feminine, protector/protected, and the public sphere/private sphere.² These scholars also insist that these binaries themselves are not as clearly delineated

¹ This data is for mid-2014; for the list of states, see Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, *Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility* (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2014), 14, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/GlobalReport2014.pdf>. Other sources for current armed conflicts include the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Armed Conflicts Database: All Conflicts,” <https://acd.iiss.org/en/conflicts?tags=CF582C41FE1847CF828694D51DE80C08> (accessed August 8, 2014); and Global Security, “Military: The World at War,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/index.html> (accessed August 7, 2014).

² While by no means an exhaustive list, see the following works for an overview of feminist/gender analysis, particularly as applied to international relations and war: *The Women and War Reader*, edited by Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (New York: New York University Press, 1998); Cynthia Cockburn, *The Space Between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict* (London: Zed Books, 1998); Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Cynthia Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Joshua S. Goldstein, *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Charlotte Hooper, *Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Joyce P. Kaufman and Kristen P. Williams, *Women at War, Women Building Peace: Challenging Gender Norms* (Boulder: Kumarian Press, 2013); Mary H. Moran, “Gender, Militarism, and Peace-Building: Projects of the Postconflict Moment,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 39 (2010): 261-74; V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, *Global Gender*

as is perceived, rather these binaries are blurred. Masculinities are not static or monolithic: there are multiple masculinities (hegemonic masculinity, subordinate masculinity). As a result, these categories/binaries are constantly contested and shifting; and the contestation becomes particularly pronounced in times of war. This chapter examines the ways in which these categories/binaries are contested in the context of wars in the contemporary period through an exploration of (1) the types of warfare, (2) modes of waging war (technology, recruitment of soldiers), and (3) international human rights and humanitarian intervention discourses. Importantly, this chapter focuses on the connection between masculinities (including hyper- or aggressive masculinity), militarization (and, relatedly, militarized masculinity), and conceptions of security.

The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the data on the wars in the Cold War and post-Cold War period, followed by an overview of the debate in the literature over whether the contemporary period is marked by “new wars” that are different in scope and scale from old wars of the past, and then an analysis of gender and the new wars. The second section examines the modes, or methods, of waging war in the contemporary period, with the focus on new technology such as drones and robots, and their impact on conceptions of masculinity and femininity. The next section focuses on international human rights and humanitarian intervention discourses in the context of war and gender, particularly the recognition of the importance of including gender in any understanding of peace, war and security as demonstrated by the passage of various UN Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security since 2000, as well as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine that calls for international intervention when there are gross human rights violations occurring within a state. Finally, the conclusion recaps the main points of the chapter and provides suggestions for areas of future research.

Gender, Globalization and “New” Wars

The types of warfare matter for understanding wars of globalization and gender. Low-intensity and asymmetrical warfare in various parts of the world might be related to the dispersal of the state’s military power to sub-state actors, but it can also represent a continuation of anti-colonial and anti-imperial warfare of an earlier age. Wars fought between states and actors that span states--be they the War on Terror or the War on Drugs, or wars involving mobilization on the basis of a transnational appeal to religion--might be new and signs of the emergence of new wars of globalization, but they could also be interpreted as a resurgence of ways of war of pre- and early modern provenance. How to understand the relations of these new/old wars to gender, and are these new wars really new?

Additionally, is aggressive/hyper-/militarized masculinity more pronounced in intrastate wars or interstate wars? Do the wars of globalization come with a renewed symbolic emphasis on gender as a means to establish borders and boundaries that threaten to come undone? Does the failure of some states leave their civilian population, and women and children in particular, at the mercy of non-state military actors, whose use of violence is

Issues (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999); Jan Jindy Pettman, *Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics* (London: Routledge, 1996); Laura Sjoberg, *Gender, War, and Conflict* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014); J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); J. Ann Tickner, *Gendering World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London: Sage, 1997).

guided by notions of aggressive masculinity that refuses to be subjected to the authority of the state? Given that women's roles in times of war and conflict vary, for example as refugees, peace activists, nonviolent resistance, armed combatants as members of formal state militaries or rebel movements/non-state militias, suicide bombers, what can this tell us about gender, military, and war in the contemporary period?

War in the Era of Globalization

Armed conflict, both interstate and intrastate conflict, in the international system has changed over time. Monty Marshall and Benjamin Cole analyzed the global trends during the period 1946-2013 in terms of intrastate conflict (referred to as societal conflict, or internal warfare: civil, communal and ethnic) and interstate conflict (external warfare), and show that "the global totals for both societal and interstate warfare have declined substantially since the end of the Cold War."³ They found that interstate war "remained fairly constant at a relatively low level" during the Cold War (1946-1991), and that intrastate war "has been the predominant mode of warfare since the mid-1950s; increasing steeply and steadily through the Cold War period" in large part because such wars are "longer, more protracted."⁴

With the Cold War's end, many of these protracted intrastate wars also ended and explain "much of the decrease in global armed conflict." With regards to the outbreak of new wars, both interstate and intrastate, the rate has declined since 1991, which represents the year that ended the Cold War and the start of the contemporary period of globalization. Most recently, there has been a slight increase in intrastate wars, primarily a result of two events: (1) the increased warfare in the Arab League states following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and (2) the "Arab Spring" uprisings that started in Tunisia in 2011 and spread within the region.⁵ Thus, the first decade of the post-Cold War period saw a decline in intrastate war, while the second decade has been marked by an increase in intrastate war.

Since 1946, "there have been 332 distinct episodes of major armed conflict" around the world. Data shows that since 1989, "over one-half of all countries have experienced

³ Marshall and Cole, *Global Report 2014*, 12. To be included in Marshall and Cole's analysis, a war (both interstate and intrastate) must have had at least "500 directly-related deaths" (p. 12). Other scholars use 1,000 annual battle deaths as the threshold for classifying a conflict as a war, including David J. Singer and Melvin Small's Correlates of War (COW) project. See Meredith Reid Sarkees for a discussion of the original COW project and subsequent modifications ("The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 of the Data)," http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/COW%20Website%20-%20Typology%20of%20war.pdf (accessed August 11, 2014)). On the issue of coding civil wars see Nicholas Sambanis, "A Note on the Death Threshold in Coding Civil War Events," June 4, 2001, <http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/ocvprogram/licep/4/sambanis/sambanis.pdf> (accessed August 11, 2014). In this paper Sambanis notes that "At present, there is no consensus in the literature on the precise threshold of violence that distinguishes a war from other events and this makes coding war events precisely rather difficult" (p. 2). The Uppsala University's Conflict Data Program (UCDP) database includes both conflicts and wars, with conflicts categorized as having more than 25 deaths, and wars categorized as having more than 1,000 deaths annually. Linda Koffmar, "Two out of five war fatalities occurred in Syria," June 12, 2014, [http://www.uu.se/en/media/news/article/?id=3514&area=2,6,10,16&typ=artikel&na=&lang=en#__utma=1.835763392.1407785317.1407785317.1407785317.1&__utmb=1.1.10.1407785317&__utmc=1&__utmz=1.1407785317.1.1.utmcsr=prio.org|utmccn=\(referral\)|utmcmd=referral|utmctt=/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/&__utmv=-&__utm=4768051](http://www.uu.se/en/media/news/article/?id=3514&area=2,6,10,16&typ=artikel&na=&lang=en#__utma=1.835763392.1407785317.1407785317.1407785317.1&__utmb=1.1.10.1407785317&__utmc=1&__utmz=1.1407785317.1.1.utmcsr=prio.org|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=referral|utmctt=/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/&__utmv=-&__utm=4768051) (accessed August 11, 2014).

⁴ Marshall and Cole, *Global Report 2014*, 12.

⁵ Marshall and Cole, *Global Report 2014*, 12.

some major armed conflict (85 of 167 countries...)." ⁶ With regards to casualties, while during World War II were about 10 million deaths on average each year, from 1946 to 2011, there have been approximately 476,000 deaths annually from conflict. Of these numbers, civilian deaths account for approximately "two-thirds of estimated total deaths" during World War II as well as the period 1946-2011. ⁷ In terms of separating out civilian deaths during the Cold War (1946-1991) and the post-Cold War period (1991-2011), "the share of non-combatant deaths during armed conflicts appears to have increased from about 62% during the Cold War period...to about 84% during the Post-Cold war period." ⁸

In considering the concern with the increase in intrastate conflicts in the contemporary period, regime type may matter. According to Marshall and Cole, "for the first time in human history, the global system is predominantly comprised of independent states and governed by democratic regimes." There are fewer autocracies today (20 in 2013 versus 89 in 1977—this was the peak number) and more democracies (48 in 1989, and five years later there were 77). There are also "anocracies"—countries that are experiencing incomplete democratic transitions. In the early 1990s there were 30 such states, and by 2013 there are 49 (this number has remained constant since the mid-1990s). The question arises as to whether we should be concerned about the increase in the number of anocracies in the contemporary period with regards to war and conflict. As Marshall and Cole assert, "Research indicates that anocracies have been highly unstable and transitory regimes, with over fifty percent experiencing a major regime change within five years and over seventy percent within ten years." They note further that "anocracies have been much more vulnerable to new outbreaks of armed societal conflict; they have been about six times more likely than democracies and two and one-half times as likely as autocracies to experience new outbreaks of societal wars." ⁹

New Wars? Old Wars?

Indicative of globalization (defined as "growing interconnectedness" due to the information and communications revolution, "growth of a global market and the dominance of the fundamentalist belief in deregulation and privatization," and "erosion of the nation-state" ¹⁰) and the increased complexity of the international system today, events at the local level are impacted by, and impact, both the regional and global levels. States seek to influence others beyond their territorial borders. International governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations, and transnational advocacy networks are part and parcel of the contemporary period. Civil society has also increased its presence and impact on the international system. ¹¹ Given the data on interstate and intrastate warfare as well as the combatant and non-combatant death rates as a result of armed conflict, and the recognition that there are a number of countries that have not fared well in their transition to democracy, the question arises: are the wars of the current globalization different from the wars of the past?

⁶ Marshall and Cole, *Global Report 2014*, 13. Marshall and Cole only include countries with a total population of 500,000 people or more.

⁷ Marshall and Cole, *Global Report 2014*, 18.

⁸ Marshall and Cole, *Global Report 2014*, 19.

⁹ Marshall and Cole, *Global Report 2014*, 24. Today's autocracies include "isolationist regimes, communist and former-communist countries, traditional monarchies, and wealthy oil-producing states" (27).

¹⁰ Mary Kaldor, "Human Security," *Society and Economy* 33, 3 (2011), 444.

¹¹ Marshall and Cole, *Global Report 2014*, 26-27.

Mary Kaldor coined the term “new war” to refer to “a new type of organized violence developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe, which is one aspect of the current globalized era.”¹² She argues that these new wars obscure the difference between war as “violence between states or organized political groups for political motives,” organized crime, and extensive human rights violations.¹³ Likewise, these new wars are impacted by globalization given the existence of transnational actors, including mercenaries, international reporters, international organizations (both IGOs and NGOs), and so forth. Additionally, as Kaldor contends, “The new wars arise in the context of the erosion of the autonomy of the state...they occur in the context of the erosion of the monopoly of legitimate organized violence. This monopoly is eroded from above and below.”¹⁴ The wars in the contemporary period can be categorized as civil wars (some of which were simmering during the Cold War, while others erupted after the Cold War ended), failed states as “breeding ground for conflict” (given that the state no longer has the monopoly of violence nor can it provide adequate public goods for its population) and asymmetric wars (with qualitatively different capabilities of the warring parties).¹⁵ By way of example, Michael Crawford and Jami Miscik demonstrate that sub-state actors in the Middle East and South Asia are able to “insert themselves at a mezzanine level of rule between the government and the people.” In the context of war and armed conflict in the contemporary period these mezzanine rulers (for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Taliban in Afghanistan) challenge the existing (usually weak) governments, particularly “when they resort to terrorism, piracy, insurgency, or other means to advance their ideological, ethnic, or nationalist agendas” and “pose a threat that goes well beyond the borders of the host state.”¹⁶ Moreover, when the rulers are able to gain almost complete control over territory, “they tend to become authoritarian and antipluralistic, ruthlessly eliminating rival groups.” Corruption and organized crime become the sources of revenue to fund their activities.¹⁷ And they also benefit, as non-state actors, from changes in military technology, particularly as they are able to access cheap weapons, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The use of suicide bombers also contributes to their ability to wage asymmetrical warfare, and challenge the state’s ability to respond effectively to the threat.¹⁸

In contrasting old wars of the past with new wars, Kaldor focuses on several factors: actors, goals, methods of warfare, and financing. The actors in the new wars vary—no longer are wars fought primarily between state armies, but in addition to regular armies, fighting includes actors such as warlords, organized criminals, mercenaries, and paramilitaries. With regards to goals, the old wars were about ideology and geo-politics

¹² Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, 3rd edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 1. For other works on wars and conflict in the contemporary period, see: Mark Duffield, *Global governance and the new wars: The merging of development and security* (London: Zed Books, 2001); Chris Hables Gray, *Post-modern war: The new politics of conflict* (London: Routledge, 1997); Herfried Munkler, *The new wars* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); and Donald M. Snow, *Uncivil wars: International security and the new internal conflicts* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

¹³ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 2.

¹⁴ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 5.

¹⁵ De Nevers, “The Geneva Conventions and New Wars,” 374-77.

¹⁶ Michael Crawford and Jami Miscik, “The Rise of the Mezzanine Rulers: The New Frontier for International Law,” *Foreign Affairs* 89, 6 (November/December 2010), 123.

¹⁷ Crawford and Miscik, “The Rise of the Mezzanine Rulers,” 126.

¹⁸ Crawford and Miscik, “The Rise of the Mezzanine Rulers,” 126.

(territory), while identity politics defines today's new wars, in which "the claim to power [is] on the basis of a particular identity—be it national, clan, religious or linguistic."¹⁹ She does not discount that earlier wars also involved identity, such as communism versus democracy, or nationalism, but such identities "were linked either to a notion of state interest or to some forward-looking project—ideas about how society should be organized."²⁰ The new wars of today "relate to an idealized nostalgic representation of the past." Such identity politics, by definition, are exclusive in which those who do not belong to a particular identity are not included.²¹ Further, globalization is linked to the new identity politics of these new wars because: (1) "they are both local and global, national as well as transnational," and (2) identity politics is able to use the new information and communications technology. For example, the use of electronic media has vastly increased the speed with which people can be politically mobilized.²² What is also striking about the new wars, based on the politics of identity, is that often these wars spill over territorial borders given that people's identities often transcend state borders. Examples abound such as Tutsis in Burundi, DRC and Rwanda; Russians in the former Soviet republics²³; Serbs in Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia.

In terms of the changed mode of warfare (to be discussed in more detail in the next section of the chapter), Kaldor points to the use of strategies such as guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, both of which have been used in past conflicts. What is different about their use in the new wars is that "the aim is to control the population by getting rid of everyone of a different identity (and indeed of a different opinion) and by instilling terror." The strategic goal in these wars is not to appeal to as many people in the population as possible in order to gain popular support (and thus control territory) but "to mobilize extremist politics based on fear and hatred." To achieve this goal, populations are expelled through strategies of mass killing (such as ethnic cleansing), involuntary resettlement, and various measures meant to intimidate the population. Such wars result in large numbers of refugees and internally displaced people, and much of the violence is deliberately targeted against non-combatants.²⁴ Unlike past wars in which the fighting forces were centralized and organized hierarchically (in essence, the state's military/armed forces), the new wars are decentralized and include different actors engaged in fighting.²⁵ Battle was the method and "decisive encounter" in old wars in which territory was captured by using the military. In contrast, battles are infrequent and sporadic, with territory "captured through political means, through control of the population" in the new wars.²⁶ What we see today are different kinds of wars, including, as Renee De Nevers observes, "wildly unbalanced conflicts pitting highly trained and technologically sophisticated armies like that of the United States against irregular combatants on horseback, to conflicts in which paramilitaries and criminals intermingle and terrorize local populations to achieve their own goals....today, war in much of the world takes place against the backdrop of failed states,

¹⁹ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 7. For a further discussion of Kaldor's argument regarding identity and war, particularly the "friend-enemy distinction," see Mary Kaldor, "Identity and War," *Global Policy* 4, 4 (November 2013): 336-46.

²⁰ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 7-8.

²¹ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 8.

²² Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 8.

²³ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 116.

²⁴ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 9.

²⁵ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 9-10.

²⁶ Mary Kaldor, "In Defense of New Wars," *Stability* 2, 1 (2013), 2.

and is fought by warlords, mercenaries, and children.”²⁷ As Crawford and Miscik note in referring to mezzanine rulers, but also applies to other non-state actors engaged in violence and different methods of warfare, “Just as the distinction between conventional and irregular warfare has eroded, so ‘war amongst the people’ has shaded into routinized violence. Mezzanine rulers tend to specialize in this kind of war,…”²⁸

Finally, the financing of new wars differ from old wars, referred to by Kaldor as “the new ‘globalized’ war economy.” The financing of old wars was centralized and total, while the new war economy is decentralized. The various groups fighting find that because they cannot engage in normal trade and also do not have access to tax revenues as is the case with governments, they use other methods to extract resources including “plunder, hostage-taking and the black market” as well as support from outside sources (such as illegal drugs and arms trade, diaspora remittances, or support from neighboring states). Importantly, continuing violence is needed so that fighting forces can obtain these financial sources such that, according to Kaldor, “a war logic is built into the functioning of the economy.”²⁹ Rather than focused on building a new state, as was the case in old wars, the new wars actually undermine the state, contributing further to its weakness.³⁰

Critics of the “new war” thesis raise several points. First, are these new wars really new? De Nevers argues that “these ‘new’ forms of warfare are better understood as a reversion to very old wars”—wars that occurred in early modern Europe in which there were both battles and plunder, and “with little distinction made between civilian and soldier.”³¹ In terms of asymmetric warfare, in the nineteenth century, European armies had more technologically advanced weapons in comparison to those places that they colonized. And “guerrilla conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s were also asymmetric in capabilities.” With regards to the financing of wars, historically wars have been financed not just by governments but also “a range of entrepreneurs and military contractors, often with unsavory reputations.” As De Nevers avers, “the need to generate resources to sustain wars was one of the factors that led to the development and bureaucratization of states—and of modern standing armies in the service of the state.”³²

In response, Kaldor argues that while there are elements in both kinds of wars, new wars have a different logic than old wars because of globalization. Importantly, “global connections are much more extensive....The ability to mobilize around both exclusivist causes [identity politics] and human rights causes has been speeded up by new communications. Communications are also increasingly a tool of war, making it easier to spread fear and panic than in earlier periods—hence spectacular acts of terrorism, for example.”³³ For Kaldor and others, “New Wars are the wars of the era of globalization.” These wars are found in countries in which the authoritarian government is weakened as a result of globalization. The binaries of the “state and non-state, public and private, external

²⁷ Renee De Nevers, “The Geneva Conventions and New Wars,” *Political Science Quarterly* 121, 3 (2006), 369.

²⁸ Crawford and Miscik, “The Rise of the Mezzanine Rulers,” 130.

²⁹ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 10.

³⁰ Kaldor, “In Defense of New Wars,” 3.

³¹ De Nevers, “The Geneva Conventions and New Wars,” 377.

³² De Nevers, “The Geneva Conventions and New Wars,” 378. De Nevers argues that “The key point about current conflicts is that they represent a present and future form of war that is far removed from the archetype for which the Geneva Conventions were designed” given that the modern European model of war with state armies fighting each other on the battlefield is not the norm, and is quite infrequent (p. 378).

³³ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 204-5. See also Kaldor, “In Defense of New Wars,” 3-4.

and internal, economic and political, and even war and peace are breaking down.”³⁴ The military tactics, as noted earlier, are different—in the new wars the method of gaining political control is through population displacement.³⁵

Second, the question arises as to whether new wars are just civil wars, and whether in the post-Cold War period we are experiencing new civil wars that are somehow different from old civil wars. Stathis Kalyvas argues that “information about recent or ongoing wars is typically incomplete or biased; [and]...historical research on earlier wars tends to be disregarded.”³⁶ He points to the distinctions made in the literature that new civil wars are “criminal, depoliticized, private, and predatory,” while old civil wars “are considered ideological, political, collective, and even noble.”³⁷ In examining the case studies of old civil wars, criminal activities such as looting occurred, just as they do in post-Cold War civil wars. And while ideology might have been an overriding motivation for intellectuals involved in civil wars, the evidence shows that at the mass level, “local considerations tended to trump ideological ones.”³⁸ Kalyvas further demonstrates that in contrast to the claim that old civil wars enjoyed significant popular support (unlike new civil wars), rebels in past cases of civil wars often used coercion against civilians, and large-scale population displacement occurred in the past as well (consider the Chinese and Spanish civil wars).³⁹ He notes that popular support “was not purely consensual, immutable, fixed, and primarily ideological. In this respect, old civil wars are not as different from new civil wars as they appear to be.”⁴⁰ The depiction that the violence of the new wars is somehow “particularly cruel” is challenged by the evidence of old civil wars. The use of children as fighters, for example, occurred in the Afghan insurgency that emerged after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua—all of which predate the end of the Cold War.⁴¹

Responding to the critique of whether new wars are civil wars, Kaldor makes it clear that “new wars are not the same as civil wars and no one has claimed that new wars are increasing or decreasing; the argument was always about the *changing character of war*” (emphasis added).⁴² And even though many of the wars in the current globalization era are intrastate, the violence of these wars “is typically not contained by state borders” with both refugees and armed groups crossing state borders, contributing to undermining countries that are geographically proximate. These wars also garner support (financial and logistical) from other states, not only those in close geographic proximity but also those that are very far away. And these conflicts are also “caused, fueled, and sustained by (and contribute to) dynamics that are not only local, but also national, regional, and global in scope.”⁴³

Whether these new wars can be considered war rather than just “mainly privatized and/or criminal” violence, her response is that new wars are “mixtures of war (organized

³⁴ Mary Kaldor, “In Defense of New Wars,” *Stability* 2, 1 (2013), 2.

³⁵ Kaldor, “In Defense of New Wars,” 5.

³⁶ Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars? A Valid Distinction?” *World Politics* 54 (October 2001), 99.

³⁷ Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars?” 100.

³⁸ Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars?” 106, 107.

³⁹ Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars?” 110.

⁴⁰ Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars?” 113.

⁴¹ Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars?” 115.

⁴² Kaldor, “In Defense of New Wars,” 8.

⁴³ Carol Cohn, “Women and Wars: Toward a Conceptual Framework,” in *Women and Wars*, ed. Carol Cohn (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013), 25.

violence for political ends), crime (organized violence for private ends) and human rights violations (violence against civilians).” She argues that the “political element” of violence is what differentiates some kinds of violence (gang violence or the war on drugs, for example) from war (Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia).⁴⁴ Added to this are the various actors involved in the fighting.⁴⁵

The third criticism revolves around the data used in differentiating types of war as the data used for examining new wars is primarily qualitative, for example, the empirical research on the Balkan Wars of the early 1990s, as well as research on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kaldor, however, examines two pieces of quantitative data in support of the new wars in that (1) there has been a marked decline in battles and (2) that the violence intentionally targets civilians. With regards to the battle deaths used to understand old wars, new wars have witnessed the significant “increase in the ratio of civilian to military casualties.” With regards to violence intentionally targeting civilians, new wars involve the “rise in the numbers of displaced people per conflict.”⁴⁶

All told, in response to the critics, Kaldor considers that the main distinction between new and old wars is that new wars have a “logic of persistence and spread” unlike old wars of the past, with new actors, goals, methods/modes, and financing of these wars, all of which are impacted by globalization and technology.⁴⁷

Gender and the “New Wars”

In the context of modern Europe and North America, as the state system developed and evolved, and governments became increasingly institutionalized and bureaucratized, there was a need for state militaries in order to maintain and ensure the security of the state. In so doing, according to Robert Nye, “the creation of a form of masculinity peculiar to the modern nation-state, in which the citizen must carry within himself the qualities of a warrior, but as a warrior must also remain the citizen he will become again at conflict’s end.” The development of national identity in the modern state system enabled the development of a national masculinity for individual soldiers.⁴⁸ The soldiers were primarily men—it was the male citizen-warrior and the concomitant construction of a particular type of masculinity, a militarized/military masculinity. This military masculinity has been more highly valued “than civic virtue and its masculinities.”⁴⁹ In essence, there is no single masculinity but rather different masculinities (and a hierarchy of masculinities), including

⁴⁴ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 207. Kaldor also differentiates between war and armed conflict, in which war has a legal definition as it must be formally declared; she also recognizes the quantitative work that looks at annual battle-deaths such as the COW project (p. 208).

⁴⁵ De Nevers, “The Geneva Conventions and New Wars,” 378-83.

⁴⁶ Kaldor, “In Defense of New Wars,” 7. Kaldor further addresses the debate about data in terms of numbers and duration of wars, numbers of casualties, and levels of forced displacement. For example, there is difficulty in differentiating between combatants and non-combatants, and thus the difficulty in obtaining accurate data for both given that combatants in the new wars include militia, police, paramilitaries, private contractors, and so forth, as well as regular armed forces, so numbers are not readily available; and data on civilians is also not clear in terms of whether civilians are casualties as a direct or indirect result of fighting (pp. 7-10).

⁴⁷ Kaldor, “In Defense of New Wars,” 3.

⁴⁸ Robert A. Nye, “Review Essay: Western Masculinities in War and Peace,” *American Historical Review* 112, 2 (2007), 417.

⁴⁹ Nye, “Review Essay: Western Masculinities in War and Peace,” 418.

hegemonic masculinity and subordinate masculinities (as well as femininities—which are further subordinated to both hegemonic masculinity and subordinate masculinities).⁵⁰

As Nye argues, “the indispensable masculine qualities of the combat soldier have altered little over the long run of modern history: personal courage, the willingness to sacrifice for comrades, the fear of shame or dishonor. Without these behavioral norms, fighting would never have endured for long.”⁵¹ Thus even with the end of the Cold War (and states no longer needing conscription), Nye argues that “it seems unlikely that volunteer armies will transform the historic social contract between the citizen-soldier and the state, or end the characteristic representation of the soldier’s body as the image of the nation,” even as states open their militaries to homosexuals and women.⁵²

In considering the connection between gender, security and war, feminist scholars argue that “gender as a power relation” helps us to understand these concepts more clearly, particularly in understanding gender subordination.⁵³ As Eric Blanchard asserts, feminist International Relations (IR) scholars make “at least four theoretical moves. First, IR feminists question the supposed nonexistence and irrelevance of women in international security politics, engendering or exposing the workings of gender and power in international relations.” Second, feminist security theory interrogates the claim that the state actually ensures women’s “‘protection’ in times of war and peace.” Third, feminist security theory questions the discourses that equate women with peace, men with violence. Finally, feminist security theory has “started to develop a variegated concept of masculinity to help explain security.”⁵⁴ In the end, as Jennifer K. Lobasz and Laura Sjoberg assert, “Feminist work addressing security has pointed out gender’s key role, conceptually in understanding security; empirically, in seeing causes and predicting outcomes; normatively, in understanding what is good and bad about security practices; and prescriptively, in terms of looking to solve the world’s most serious security problems.”⁵⁵

While feminist scholars have focused on the connection between war, peace and gender (including the range of women’s roles in war, as both noncombatants, supporters of war, and as combatants), the mainstream literature on “new wars” has not adequately addressed gender, even though wars, historically and in the contemporary period, rely on gender constructions of masculinity and femininity, and the expected roles and behavior of men and women in any society. Scholars, consequently, have begun to rectify the omission of gender in the debate and writings on new wars. As David Duriesmith asserts, “including masculinity in the analysis of new wars explains the significance of attacks against civilians in a way that previous literatures have failed to do.”⁵⁶ Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor write, “there are specific differences in the way gender is constructed in different types of war....[and] we suggest that ‘new wars’...can be interpreted as a mechanism for rolling back

⁵⁰ R. W. Connell, *Masculinities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); R. W. Connell and J. W. Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic masculinity: rethinking the concept,” *Gender & Society*, 19, 6 (2005): 829-859.

⁵¹ Nye, “Review Essay: Western Masculinities in War and Peace,” 419-20.

⁵² Nye, “Review Essay: Western Masculinities in War and Peace,” 438.

⁵³ Laura Sjoberg, “Seeing Gender in International Security” (June 5, 2012), <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/05/seeing-gender-in-international-security/> (accessed August 16, 2012).

⁵⁴ Eric M. Blanchard, “Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory,” *Signs* 28, 4 (Summer 2003), 1290.

⁵⁵ Jennifer K. Lobasz and Laura Sjoberg, “Introduction,” *Politics & Gender* 7, 4 (2011), 573.

⁵⁶ David Duriesmith, “Is Manhood a Causal Factor in the Shifting Nature of War? The Case of Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front,” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 16, 2 (2014), 237.

any gains women may have made in recent decades.”⁵⁷ Given that new wars “tend to be persistent and more difficult to end” (whereas old wars “tend to be extreme in the sense of maximizing and totalizing violence”), there is a different (and differently gendered) logic to these wars.⁵⁸

In returning to Kaldor’s factors that differentiate old and new wars, with regards to actors, both old and new wars are fought primarily by men, although this does not discount the role that women play as fighters too. But by and large, the fighters are male—and in the new wars, they are regular armed forces, warlords, paramilitaries, mercenaries, and so forth—and wartime masculinity prevails.⁵⁹ Carol Cohn points out that “If militaries and armed insurgent groups are gendered institutions which rely on ideas about valued masculinities and devalued femininities for their very ability to function, they will both attract and produce men with heavy investments in ‘manly’ behaviors and in never appearing weak/feminized/subordinately masculine.”⁶⁰

Given that new wars are bound up with identity politics, such identities, regardless of whether they are ethnic, religious or tribal, are also connected to gender.⁶¹ As noted by Deniz Kandiyoti, “The association of women with the private domain [home/domestic sphere] reinforces the merging of the nation/community with the selfless mother/devout wife; the obvious response of coming to her defense and even dying for her is automatically triggered.”⁶² In times of conflict and war, leaders will invoke feminine metaphors (“mothers of the nation,” “motherland”) in order to reinforce threats to the nation/ethnic group. Women must be submissive to the goals of the ethnic or national group by accepting their “natural roles” as women and mothers.⁶³ In this way, ethnic/national identity are connected to gender identity.

Because the new wars are fought not primarily with battles but violence that is deliberately targeted against civilians, political control of territory is achieved through invoking fear and expelling or killing “those who disagree or have a different identity.”⁶⁴ When attacks do occur, men of fighting age are targeted first even if they are not combatants. Thus, while women, children and the elderly are also victims in times of war, more men, both as combatants and civilians, are killed. These wars are gendered in that one of the techniques of population displacement is systematic rape and sexual abuse committed primarily against civilian women, although men are also victims of sexual violence.⁶⁵ This does not mean that systematic sexual abuse and violence did not occur in old wars (one can think of Japan’s “comfort women”), they did. However, what Chinkin and Kaldor argue is that “the nature of the instrumentalization in new wars is very different. There is little concern about opprobrium, security leaks, or the spread of venereal disease. The rapes are

⁵⁷ Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor, “Gender and New Wars,” *Journal of International Affairs* 67, 1 (Fall/Winter 2013), 168.

⁵⁸ Chinkin and Kaldor, “Gender and New Wars,” 169.

⁵⁹ Chinkin and Kaldor, “Gender and New Wars,” 170.

⁶⁰ Cohn, “Women and Wars: A Conceptual Framework,” 30.

⁶¹ Chinkin and Kaldor, “Gender and New Wars,” 171.

⁶² Deniz Kandiyoti, “Women, Ethnicity and Nationalism,” in *Ethnicity*, eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 315.

⁶³ Julie Mostov, “Sexing the nation/desexing the body: Politics of national identity in the former Yugoslavia,” in *Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the nation*, ed. Tamar Mayer (London: Routledge, 2000), 98-102.

⁶⁴ Chinkin and Kaldor, “Gender and New Wars,” 173.

⁶⁵ Chinkin and Kaldor, “Gender and New Wars,” 173; Kaldor, *New Wars, Old Wars*, 105.

deliberately public, and are meant to instill fear in local populations as part of a plan to destroy or control local communities.”⁶⁶ Child soldiers, while also not a new phenomenon, “are appearing more frequently in combat...Girls are almost as likely as boys to be pulled into combat, and not just in support roles.”⁶⁷

The financing of wars is also different in the contemporary period. Taxation and a centralized war economy that was total, with all citizens participating, is no longer the main form of financing wars. Warring groups must find other means of financial support (looting, remittances from the diaspora, “taxation” on humanitarian assistance, and the illegal trade in commodities such as diamonds, drugs, and people). These other means of attaining financial support are gendered. When women are victims of human trafficking or have few options other than engage in the sex industry, or the much-needed humanitarian assistance is not available, women are affected directly and indirectly by the violence. These “predatory social relationships” invariably impact women and men differently, with women bearing the brunt of such relationships.⁶⁸ V. Spike Peterson examines the connection between new wars and the gendered economies, noting that what she calls the “coping economy,” which develops because of “individual survival and the social reproduction of families and households,” is highly feminized. Women tend to be responsible “for sustaining families, households, kinship networks, and even neighborhoods” even in times of war. When the economic situation becomes dire, women engage in coping strategies that “rely increasingly on informal and often illicit activities” such as sex work.⁶⁹ She also describes “combat economies” necessary to fund fighters. Looting, abduction, and smuggling are some of the illicit economic activities that finance these wars.⁷⁰ According to Peterson, in contrast to the coping economy, which is highly feminized, the combat economy is highly masculinized. She does note, however, that “this generalization [about the combat economy] obscures the complexity of wartime conditions and how they disrupt traditional gender identities and divisions of labor.”⁷¹

Overall, the new wars are gendered differently than the old wars: “the new warrior... deliberately engages in excessive violence against civilians, including women.”⁷² Chinkin and Kaldor argue that “the extreme gender inequalities associated with new wars can only be sustained through continued violence, precisely because the masculinity associated with ‘new wars’ is so ambiguous and insecure” as a result of “the low participation in new wars, the systematic application of deliberate gendered violence against civilians, and the difficulty of sustaining exclusive identities in a world of open communication.”⁷³

⁶⁶ Chinkin and Kaldor, “Gender and New Wars,” 175.

⁶⁷ De Nevers, “The Geneva Conventions and New Wars,” 382.

⁶⁸ Chinkin and Kaldor, “Gender and New Wars,” 175-76.

⁶⁹ V. Spike Peterson, “‘New Wars’ and Gendered Economies,” *Feminist Review* 88 (2008), 15.

⁷⁰ Peterson, “‘New Wars’ and Gendered Economies,” 15. Peterson also has a third category, “criminal economies,” that involve “petty criminals, conflict entrepreneurs, war profiteers, traffickers, money launderers, and those who produce and/or transport trafficked goods.” There is also often an overlap between the combat and criminal economies (p. 16).

⁷¹ Peterson, “‘New Wars’ and Gendered Economies,” 16. While not focused on war and conflict, Carla Freeman examines gender and globalization, and the “decoupling of the link that has fused gender with the local and left the macropicture of globalization bereft of gender as a constitutive force.” Carla Freeman, “Is Local: Global as Feminine:Masculine? Rethinking the Gender of Globalization,” *Signs* 26, 4 (2001), 1012.

⁷² Chinkin and Kaldor, “Gender and New Wars,” 177.

⁷³ Chinkin and Kaldor, “Gender and New Wars,” 177.

Gender and Modes of Warfare

The changes in the modes of warfare and ways of organizing war are also gendered. The technologies used in today's wars, such as drones, robotics and long-range missiles, enable states to avoid using ground troops and thus minimize the risk of incurring casualties on the battlefield. In considering militarized masculinity, the use of such technology may affect the notions of "manly soldiering." Moreover, in order to recruit new members, the military continues to link the traditional focus on masculinity with the military. But this link between masculinity and the military may be weakened if the technology being utilized does not involve soldiers' direct engagement with the enemy on the battlefield.

Kaldor asserts that with changes in mode of warfare, we are witnessing "a revolution in the social relations of warfare, not in technology, even though the changes in social relations are influenced by and make use of new technology."⁷⁴

Gender, War, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention

As feminist security theorists show, war affects the personal security of civilians, security often destabilized as a result of changes in the rules of engagement and the boundaries of what constitutes the battlefield. Such conflicts have led to other threats to women's physical security, both in terms of personal violation, such as rape, which has increasingly become a tool of war, but also the threat of violence at home, in the private sphere, as domestic violence is linked to social or state-sponsored violence. For example, recognizing the systematic policy of mass rape in the war in Bosnia (1992-95), the international community responded by establishing international human rights law which, for the first time in history, recognized the existence of gendered war crimes. The recognition of the impact of war on women and girls also led to the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions, which call for women's participation in peace talks and post-conflict reconstruction. The question arises as to whether international human rights law and the discourse surrounding human rights become tools to justify wars and military interventions, particularly in the context of Western intervention in non-Western states. How does this human rights discourse relate to the binaries of protector and protected? Are those who are being protected (women and children) actually being protected by the protectors? How does aggressive/militarized masculinity reinforce the protector/protected trope?

What is needed for soldiers to fight, and to maintain and promote a particular kind of military masculinity is femininity. Consequently, militaries and security are gendered, as they depend on the continued gender binaries of men/masculinity/soldier/protector and women/femininity/civilian/protected. Yet, as Laura Sjoberg and Jessica Peet show, there is a "protection racket" at play: "women are promised protection from wars by men who then take credit for protecting them, while not actually doing so..." And yet, the civilian immunity principle (in which noncombatants are not to be targeted in times of war and conflict) in reality does not protect women: "When feminists argue that 'men' protect 'women' in war, they mean that 'masculinity' protects 'femininity' ideationally, whether or not men (or anyone else) protects women (or anyone else) in real material terms."⁷⁵ As

⁷⁴ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 4.

⁷⁵ Laura Sjoberg and Jessica Peet, "A(nother) Dark Side of the Protection Racket," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 13, 2 (June 2011), 167.

Sjoberg and Peet aver, “Women’s need for protection justifies wars, but it also justifies the social dominance of masculinity, a requirement for war-fighting.”⁷⁶

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War brought about a new world order. The international system was no longer dominated by the conflict between the two superpowers, and the number of intrastate wars declined as the U.S. and USSR no longer supported one side or another in a civil war. In fact, “more conflicts ended in the 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall than in the preceding half century...The proportion of countries fighting civil wars had declined to about 12% [from 18%] by 1995.”⁷⁷ What also changed with regards to intrastate wars were their outcomes. Victory by one side in the war accounted for 58% of outcomes until 1989. In the post-Cold War period, victory by one side has decreased to 13%, while “negotiated endings” have increased from 10% to nearly 40%. For the remainder of these conflicts, they are “subsiding to a level of violence below the threshold of war.”⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Sjoberg and Peet, “A(nother) Dark Side of the Protection Racket,” 168.

⁷⁷ “How to stop the fighting, sometimes,” *The Economist*, November 6, 2013, 26.

⁷⁸ “How to stop the fighting, sometimes,” 26.