

## Conference

### **Gender, War and Culture: From Colonial Conquest, Standing Armies and Revolutionary Wars to the Wars of Nations and Empires (1650s-1910s)**

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#### **Part II: Chapter 11**

#### **MOBILIZATION FOR WAR AND NATION: GENDER, CULTURE, AND PROPAGANDA IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES**

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The British jurist Edward Creasy began his 1851 classic *The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World from Marathon to Waterloo* with the sentence: “It is an honorable characteristic of the Spirit of this Age that projects of violence and warfare are regarded among civilized states with steadily increasing aversion.” He ended his book by observing, “We see no captive standards of our European neighbors brought to our shrines.” Instead, “We see the banners of every civilized nation waving over the arena of our competition with each other in the arts that minister to our race’s support and happiness...”<sup>1</sup>

Two generations after the “French wars” that convulsed Europe, contemporaries could imagine the transformation of martial conflict into a peaceful world of free trade and national cultural development. Alas, this liberal dream of universal harmony would be undone by the dragon’s teeth sown during those same conflicts. The Napoleonic wars had awakened powerful feelings of attachment to the military accomplishments of peoples and nations preserved in the form of histories, songs, symbols, and monuments. Latent for the moment after two generations without a major war, these cultural memorials marked the sacrifices, the heroism, and the collective will of those conflicts.<sup>2</sup> The wars that erupted between 1854 and 1870 in Europe and North America provided the impetus for the reanimation of these memorials and their integration with those created in mid-century wars.

The era of constant warfare between 1792 and 1815 had forged new emotional bonds between peoples and nationhood and opened for some men a potential path to citizenship. To have fought in the mass armies of France or one of the allied powers was to have briefly escaped the experience of --sometimes involuntary-- long enlistments and life-time careers that characterized both pre-war service and the professional armies that were reinstated after 1815.<sup>3</sup> My aim in this chapter is to consider how these bonds between the military, civilians, and the nation were cultivated and intensified in the course of the nineteenth century. I hope to show how gender played an important role in the ways military and civilian cultures became more intimately conjoined and how the image and reputation of the soldier attained unprecedented ubiquity and status.

The gendered ironies of these developments are striking. As modern conscription flooded the ranks with more civilians, military culture became more segregated and more pointedly masculine. As women sought to mobilize auxiliary support for soldiers, they found themselves confined to roles similar to those they filled at home, though their images were sometimes deployed in ways that stretched these conventions to the limit. However, rather than infusing military culture with civilian ideals, civil society was penetrated by the values and ideals of military culture in a variety of ways. Women’s ostensible confinement to private life did not shield them from these

military influences; indeed, their contribution to national strength, and their conceivable path to full citizenship were predicated on their embrace of traditional gender roles. Men and boys gradually adopted some of the values and practices once exclusive to military culture and kept them alive in organizational life and sport. By the end of the century many civilians believed war to be inevitable with the same degree of conviction Edward Creasy and other liberals had seen peace on the horizon in 1851.

## I

Memories of military glory in the Napoleonic wars were kept alive for the next forty years in official and informal ways. Military heroes such as Wellington, Blücher, and Kutusov were celebrated in statues and monuments; after a decent hiatus, Napoleon's ashes were brought back from St Helena in 1840, paraded through Paris to tunes of specially-commissioned military marches, and buried in the Invalides. Participation in such spectacles became commonplace on the part of the professional armies of the era, not least because they were dependent on the "allure of display" to attract recruits who were "the better sort of man": taller, healthier, or easily regimented. Garrison towns were particularly familiar with the colorful uniforms, bands, and the erect posture and drill precision of troops on parade.<sup>4</sup> In France, even before Napoleon's rehabilitation, political and war memorials amalgamated Revolutionary with Napoleonic symbols: the eagle, the laurel crown, the cocarde and phrygian bonnet, and the coq gaulois.<sup>5</sup>

Napoleonic military legends were also transmitted outside official venues. Bonaparte's veterans returned from the wars to their villages to a modest celebrity, well-traveled and more literate than the locals and eager to tell their tales of heroism and sacrifice.<sup>6</sup> They represented military masculinity and the ideal of national service in otherwise remote regions, and their exploits and fraternal bonds were portrayed in their memoirs, in millions of popular *images d'épinal*, and, often with great sympathy, in stories by the writers Stendhal, Balzac, Hugo, Maupassant, and Zola.<sup>7</sup> According to Gérard de Puymège, the stereotypical Napoleonic veteran, Nicolas Chauvin, was invented to serve as a military everyman in popular culture, featured in plays, poems, broadsides, and engravings as "the perfect cultural model" of the ideal soldier: patriotic, tractable, a conformist.<sup>8</sup>

In addition, the soldiers who fought in the Napoleonic Wars participated in the penumbra of honor until then largely associated with noble status. Napoleon encouraged this democratic expansion of honor by creating the Legion of Honor in 1802 in order to tie meritorious military service to *La Patrie* and himself, though the award was open to civilians who might be similarly inspired.<sup>9</sup> In the peacetime armies of the first half of the nineteenth century, the practice of awarding medals and honors became increasingly common, as did the incentive offered to every man to earn promotion, acquire a more brilliant uniform, and thus attain a greater measure of honor.<sup>10</sup> Principles of honor also influenced codes of military conduct in nineteenth-century armies respecting the treatment of civilians, especially women and children; soldiers internalized the notion that they fought to defend the honor of women, region, regiment and fatherland.<sup>11</sup>

## II

The wars fought between 1854 and 1871 and the imperial conflicts that continued up to 1914 opened a new era in the conduct and meaning of warfare. The first of these in Europe were "cabinet" wars undertaken for annexation or adjustments in the balance of power, but the American Civil War and the later stages of the German and Italian wars of unification were driven by popular national and ideological causes that profoundly engaged civilians, prompting novel forms of voluntarism. The Prussian military reforms of 1859 adopted strategic plans aimed at the complete destruction of enemy forces and degradation of the civilian will to resist, though these measures were first applied by Union forces against the Confederacy in the last stages of the American Civil War.<sup>12</sup>

Morse code and underwater cable shortened communication times and made press war coverage feasible and lucrative, which inspired the *Times* of London to send four correspondents to the Crimea. Journalists sent lurid dispatches home about blundering leadership and suffering

soldiers aimed at shaming civilians in a style that evoked the sentimental realist novels of the day.<sup>13</sup> These accounts inspired an outpouring of sympathy and a flood of relief funds. Among other consequences, this support enabled Florence Nightingale to train and transport nurses to the front, thus providing British men and women with unprecedented images of heroic femininity.<sup>14</sup> Similar women's volunteer efforts arose in Germany in the wars of unification and on both sides of the American Civil War.<sup>15</sup> Nursing and other volunteer activities did little to advance women's path to full citizenship; they remained spatially segregated from danger and undertook duties similar to those they performed at home. American women on both sides of the conflict shared in the sacrifice of their respective sectional causes, during which northern women formed closer bonds of civic attachment to the nation state.<sup>16</sup>

It took little time for governments and generals to realize the dangers to military objectives and morale inherent in a free mass press; uncensored reporting ended with the Crimean war.<sup>17</sup> However, newspapers and the periodical press did not require official encouragement in order to sanctify their own cause and demonize their foes, or to contrast their own "civilized" behavior with the "barbarism" of the enemy. Civilian casualties and guerrilla warfare in the American war and the Franco-Prussian War spurred the press to levels of hatred and racial caricature that circulated in journalistic and literary discourse until 1914.<sup>18</sup> Jacob Vogel has written persuasively of the "folkloric militarism" that drove the love for all things military after the mid-century wars. Earlier in the century, G.F.W. Hegel, and his contemporary Carl Von Clausewitz had both argued for the self-constituting influence of wars on collective identity and of the ennobling and virilizing example of military sacrifice;<sup>19</sup> Vogel points out that nation-states did not need to take a guiding hand in the militarization of civil society--indeed were often suspicious of it-- because popular sentiment usually took the lead.<sup>20</sup>

### III

Of the great powers only Great Britain and the United States failed to implement some form of conscription after 1870. Prussia had taken the lead in the 1860s, but other nations quickly followed suit. Professional officers met the challenge of perpetually training raw recruits by isolating them from civilian life, strictly enforcing internal rules and respect for military hierarchy, and engaging in endless drills and war exercises. None of this was so different from pre-conscription armies; the bonding mechanisms of drill, the inculcation of military bearing, and teaching of unquestioned obedience had historically produced efficient fighting men.<sup>21</sup> The difference was that the experience of military service now became an integral part of the life cycle of most young men, raising them to manhood and familiarizing them with the joys and miseries of an exclusive masculine sociability.

Military training became a rite of passage in the general sense of separating men from their civilian habits and in the specific sense of sexual initiation. In rural France village lads escorted the new recruit to the nearest brothel in order to be able to proclaim him "bon pour les filles" and "bon pour le service."<sup>22</sup> Mass conscription armies generally discouraged married men from enlisting, which made army experience the crucial dividing line between youth and mature adulthood for eligible males. And in the multi-ethnic Hapsburg Empire, this universal rite of passage provided a common life experience for men of diverse backgrounds that they carried into their service in the reserves.<sup>23</sup> As Ute Frevert has written, men were also taught the elementary hygiene, sewing and washing skills they needed to sustain themselves, incorporating this sense of independence into their fledgling manhood.<sup>24</sup> The conjunction of training in arms, service to the nation, and demonstration of their fitness to marry encouraged men to also see their coming of age as the defining moment of their full citizenship.

Following their service in the reserves many men joined veteran's organizations, where they could continue their military idyll. Thousands of local groups had been formed in European countries by the 1880s, and there were 3,000,000 members in German veteran societies in 1913. These groups began as mutual aid societies for veterans who had fallen on hard times, but they soon

became important venues for male sociability and for recreations featuring shooting competitions. Veterans invested in dress uniforms and side arms in order to march on special occasions such as the Emperor's birthday or an imperial jubilee; thus decked out, they were often accorded places of honor in local festivities.<sup>25</sup>

Men who had experienced the "non-risk rite of passage" of peacetime training harbored notably romanticized views on the masculine virtues of military life, an outlook shared by many non-combatant literary men reflecting on the lessons of the most savage 19<sup>th</sup> c. wars.<sup>26</sup> More interesting are the attitudes of men who had undergone the horrors of war and, as peacetime veterans, worried that young men would not grow into manhood without experiencing military conflict. As David W. Blight has written of one Civil War veteran, his nostalgia for the soldier life made him "a candidate for the cycles of selective memory that would both plague and inspire Civil War veterans."<sup>27</sup> The other imperishable memories gleaned from wartime experience were negative stereotypes of the hated foe. The earnest atmosphere of national reconciliation in a re-united America, which included apparently friendly battle reunions like those held by Gettysburg veterans in 1913 and 1938, concealed unresolved sentiments of rage.<sup>28</sup>

#### IV

Memorials to honor the dead had the power to keep such sentiments alive, but they also performed more integrative functions. Women were indispensable to commemoration as organizers and volunteers and as symbols of national unity and strength. Contemporary gender conventions regarded men to be different in their respective ways (class, occupation, capacity), but women's traditional generative and maternal images encouraged their representation as unifying symbols (Britannia, Germania, Marianne, Lady Liberty) and as redeemers of men fallen in battle. The Niederwald memorial that kept watch on the Rhine was part "valkyrie, mother, virgin, and lorelei," qualities echoed in French images of Marianne throughout the Third Republic.<sup>29</sup> Michael Dorsch has studied the myriad statues executed in France after the Franco-Prussian war representing fallen or wounded soldiers surmounted by colossal images of strong, masculine women, comforting the defeated "while offering a hopeful vision of the vengeance and retribution yet to come."<sup>30</sup>

Post-war commemoration was driven more by volunteer activities than state direction. Jean Quataert has shown how German women's role in organizing commemorations and doing philanthropic work demonstrated their indispensability in both war and peace.<sup>31</sup> Rachel Chrastil has written that French women were instrumental in raising money for tombs and staging commemorations to the dead. What began as memorial ceremonies to mourn the dead near the Lorraine battlefield of Mars-le-Tour became an annual all-day event with 20,000 visitors, a museum, and patriotic speeches. Speakers on these occasions did not dwell on the causes or blame for these deaths but increasingly sought to provide meaning and lessons in sacrifice and patriotism to the living.<sup>32</sup> Women were also instrumental everywhere in Europe in the gendered work of organizing and staffing Red Cross and nursing services, intervening locally in natural disasters while preparing for future wars.<sup>33</sup>

Richard J. Evans has written that the vogue for studying commemoration has revealed multiple layers of overlapping "national, regional, and class allegiances," challenging the notion that patriotic feeling is a unitary concept or emotion.<sup>34</sup> In newly-united Germany, festivals and commemorative practices in Württemberg continued to mourn or celebrate local martyrs and heroes, but in a way that nested the local *heimat* within the greater national community, harmonizing social action and symbolic representation.<sup>35</sup> When local and national identities were in conflict, unifying symbols or celebrations emerged to transcend them. The Emperor's birthday played this role in Germany; in the Hapsburg Empire the birthdays and Jubilees of Franz Joseph, honoring him as "first soldier of the monarchy," served a similar function.<sup>36</sup> However, virtually everywhere after mid-century, it was the army and military images that served as the symbols of national unity and "schools for the nation": in recently-united nations with distinct class and

regional divisions, or in multi-national empires like Austria-Hungary,<sup>37</sup> or in old nations like France where religious and political differences ran deep.

#### V

What was the image of the soldier in the era of the new conscription armies? The opportunities for public military display increased dramatically after mid-century. A proliferation of royal birthdays, jubilees, centennials, empire days, and public military exercises provided occasions for parades, brass bands, and full military dress in garrison towns and capitols alike. Military bands were particularly popular. The “band revolution” of the early 19<sup>th</sup> c., based in large part on cheaper, simplified brass instruments, permitted even small towns to field marching bands and invest in colorful uniforms modeled on military dress. Civilian and military band competitions in large public venues were common throughout Europe and North America.<sup>38</sup> The variety and ostentation of military uniforms reached a high point in these years. Military painters like Detaille, Meissonier, and Elizabeth Butler recaptured uniforms of the past in their popular and much-reproduced work, and the public was familiar with the distinctive costumes of regimental units.<sup>39</sup> As Ute Frevert has written, “Hardly a memoir written by contemporaries in the Wilhelminian era, whatever their gender or class, fails to mention military parades or music, and always with a positive connotation.”<sup>40</sup>

There is some consensus among historians that military spectacles and the publicity of imperial conquest raised the status of soldiers and military values and helped erase public memories of the drunken, disorderly “lifer” of yesteryear.<sup>41</sup> Soldiers appeared regularly on stage in popular music hall revues and dramas to represent patriotic or imperial themes.<sup>42</sup> The “new journalism” of the European mass press lionized the “heroes” of empire in story and graphic displays.<sup>43</sup> Colonial explorations and military campaigns were closely followed, and popular writers invented a new genre of adventure stories for men and boys that celebrated suffering, dedication, and the military virtues. Women, when they appeared in this genre literature, were vulnerable and often sexually threatened.<sup>44</sup> A theme that links together much of the civic militarism of the era is the minor role governments played in this development; though the volunteers who organized national celebrations and philanthropies, journalists, writers, artists, musicians, and the custodians of popular entertainment knew a popular cause when they saw one.

#### VI

The cultural discourse that articulated and synthesized the various elements of civic militarism most successfully was a language of national health that equated the fitness of the nation with the fitness of its citizens, and, especially, with the fitness of the soldiers who must defend it. Manpower was still the basis of military power, and by this measure the French had fallen behind other European powers, though they were at least not bleeding emigrants at a similar rate to the others. The gender and sexual elements in this discourse applied to every nation. The French worried about birth rates, the British about the “deterioration” of the urban masses, the Italians about degeneration, the Germans about weakening heterosexual desire, and Americans about commercialism and the closing of the frontier to manly exploration.<sup>45</sup> And they were all worried about the debilitating effects of “civilization,”<sup>46</sup>

The shared concerns in this brew were women’s reproductive fitness and the fighting qualities of men, matters sometimes subsumed into the language of race and gender.<sup>47</sup> A man’s sacrifice was to serve bravely; a woman’s sacrifice could be to raise relief funds, nurse in a future conflict, or pay the “blood tax” of pregnancy and childbirth. European feminists commonly based the appeal for full citizenship rights precisely on these grounds, even though all these options left women confined in the domestic sphere.<sup>48</sup> The cultivation of sport and physical fitness in the schools in the 1870s was a public initiative, but the private sporting movement drew inspiration from many of the bio-medical concerns that drove educators.<sup>49</sup> The “games revolution” may have originated as a form of rational recreation to distract wayward youth, but it soon developed a military *telos* that was even more directly expressed through the spread of uniformed boy brigades and scouting in Europe and North America.

The ultimate influence of military values on civilian culture took the form of the new category of civic heroism. Civic heroes could contribute to the fatherland philanthropically as volunteers to national causes, or in the more direct sense of risking life and limb to rescue or protect the vulnerable. Public and private institutions bestowed medals and honors to reward bravery or generosity in elaborate ceremonies that resembled their military counterparts.<sup>50</sup> Women were eligible for these awards as well and were praised in the same language of sacrifice to the nation as male recipients. In France, it became common in such moments to evoke the supreme example of Joan of Arc, or the suffering but resolute women of the conquered provinces. We can speculate that it was comforting to know this capacity for heroism in one's neighbors, but it did tend to place soldiers and civilians in the same category of availability and capacity for mobilization.

[conclusion to await later developments]

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<sup>1</sup> Edward Creasy, *The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World from Marathon to Waterloo* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, n.d.), ix, 446-7.

<sup>2</sup> For France and Germany see Joan B. Landes, "Republican Citizenship and Heterosexual Desire: Concepts of Masculinity in Revolutionary France," and Karen Hagemann, "German Heroes: The Cult of the Death for the Fatherland in Nineteenth-Century Germany," in Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann and John Tosh, eds., *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 96-115, 116-136;

<sup>3</sup> On these distinctions see David A. Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007).

<sup>4</sup> Scott Hughes Myerly, *British Military Spectacle From the Napoleonic Wars Through the Crimea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 53-64.

<sup>5</sup> Catherine Savage Brosman, *Visions of War in France: Fiction, Art, Ideology* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 30-35.

<sup>6</sup> David M. Hopkin, *Soldier and Peasant in French Popular Culture, 1766-1870* (Suffolk and Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2003), 54-55, 220-221, 269-275;

<sup>7</sup> Brian Joseph Martin, *Napoleonic Friendship: Military Fraternity, Intimacy, and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century France* (Durham, NH: University of New Hampshire Press, 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Gérard de Puymège, "The Good Soldier Chauvin," in Pierre Nora and Lawrence D. Kritzman, eds., *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past Vol II Traditions*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 332-360; see also Ouriel Reshef, *Guerres, mythes et caricatures: au Berceau d'une mentalité française* (Paris, 1984).

<sup>9</sup> Michael J. Hughes, "Making Frenchmen into Warriors: Martial Masculinity in Napoleonic France," in Christopher J. Forth and Bertrand Taithe, eds. *French Masculinities: History, Culture and Politics* (Houndsmills, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 57-59.

<sup>10</sup> Myerly, 87, 92-4.

<sup>11</sup> Peter H. Wilson, "Defining Military Culture," *Journal of Military History* 72#1 (Jan, 2008), 34-5; Ute Frevert, "Honor, Gender, and Power: The Politics of Satisfaction in Pre-War Europe," in Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson, eds., *An Improbable War: The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 233-55; Michael Fellman argues that Civil War combatants respected the honor of enemy women in the conflict because they could then "proclaim that their slaughter of one another was done in service to their protection of women.." see "At the Nihilist Edge: Reflections on Guerilla Warfare During the American Civil War," in Stig Förster and Jörg Nagel, eds., *The Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 530.

<sup>12</sup> Manfred Messerschmidt, "The Prussian Army from Reform to War," 263-282; Herman M. Hattaway, "The Civil War Armies: Creation, Mobilization and Development," 189-96, in Förster and Nagler, *On the Road to Total War*.

<sup>13</sup> Stephanie Markovits, *The Crimean War in the British Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 23-4, 46-54.

<sup>14</sup> On Nightingale and her image in the Victorian era see Mary Poovey, *Uneven Developments: The Ideological Work of Gender in Mid-Victorian England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

<sup>15</sup> Jean H. Quataert, "German Patriotic Women's Work in War and Peacetime," in Förster and Nagler, eds., *On the Road to Total War*, 449-477.

<sup>16</sup> Drew Faust, *Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War* (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 17, 81-93; Nina Silber, *Daughters of the Union: Northern Women Fight The Civil War* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 10-12.

<sup>17</sup> Peter Young and Peter Jesser, *The Media and the Military. From the Crimea to Desert Strike* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 21-28.

<sup>18</sup> Michael E. Nolan, *The Inverted Image: Mythologizing the Enemy in France and Germany, 1898-1914* (Berghahn: Oxford and New York, 2005); Mark R. Stoneman, "The Bavarian Army and French Civilians in the War of 1870-71," *War in History* 8 #3 (July, 2001), 271-293; Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, "Public Opinion in 1870-71 and the Emergence of Total War," 409-410; Phillip S. Paludan, "The Better Angels of Our Nature: Public Opinion in the North During the Civil War," 363-4 in Förster and Nagler, eds., *On the Road to Total War*. Daniel Pick writes of the "Anthropologization" of the "other" in the Franco-Prussian war in Daniel Pick, *War Machine: The Rationalization of Slaughter in the Modern Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 90-91.

<sup>19</sup> Daniel Pick, *War Machine*, 30-33.

<sup>20</sup> Jakob Vogel, "Military, Folklore, Eigensinn: Folkloric Militarism in Germany and France, 1871-1914," *Central European History* 33 #4 (2000), 487-504; see also Vogel, *Nationen in Gleichschritt: Der Kult der "Nation in Waffen" in Deutschland und Frankreich* (Göttingen, 1997).

<sup>21</sup> On pre-1850 training procedures see Myerly, *British Military Spectacle*. On the ancient roots of the drill see William H. McNeill, *Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). The women entrepreneurs who provisioned most European armies until after the Crimean War were gradually replaced by centralized, military provisioners. For France see Thomas Cardoza, *Intrepid Women: Cantinières and Vivandières of the French Army* (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 2010).

<sup>22</sup> Anne-Marie Sohn, "*Sois un Homme!*" *La Construction de la Masculinité au XIXe Siècle* (Paris: Seuil, 2009), 205-217. This ritual was still alive in the French Foreign Legion well into the twentieth century. See Rosemary McKechnie, "Women and the Foreign Legion," in Sharon MacDonald, Pat Holden, and Shirley Ardener, eds., *Images of Women in Peace and War: Cross-Cultural and Historical Perspectives* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 122-47.

<sup>23</sup> Laurence Cole, "Military veterans and Popular Patriotism in Imperial Austria, 1870-1914," in Laurence Cole and Daniel Unowsky, eds., *The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Hapsburg Monarchy* (Oxford and New York: Berghahn, 2007), 38-41.

<sup>24</sup> Ute Frevert, *A nation in Barracks: Modern German Military Conscription and Civil Society*. Trans. Andrew Boreham and David Brückenhaus (Oxford and New York: Berghahn, 2007), 70-75.

<sup>25</sup> Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks*; Thomas Rohkrämer, "*Der Militarismus der kleinen Leute: Die Kriegervereine in Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1870-1914*" (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990); Cole, "Military Veterans and Popular Patriotism in Imperial Austria, 1870-1914," 36-61.

<sup>26</sup> The phrase is Jeremy Black's in *Warfare in the Western World, 1882-1975* (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 2002), 26. For an analysis of the literary response to the American Civil

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War see John Stauffer, "Embattled Manhood and the New England Writers," in Catherine Clinton and Nina Silber, eds., *Battle Scars: Gender and Sexuality in the American Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 120-139.

<sup>27</sup> David W. Blight, "No Desperate Hero: Manhood and Freedom in a Union Soldier's Experience," 63; Reid Mitchell, "Soldiering, Manhood, and Coming of Age: A Northern Volunteer," 43-54 in Catherine Clinton, Nina Silber, *Divided Houses: Gender and the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Peter Karsten, "Militarism and Rationalization in the United States," in John Gillis, ed., *Militarization in the Western World* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 31-4.

<sup>28</sup> Caroline E. Janney, *Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2013).

<sup>29</sup> Patricia Mazon, "The Niederwald National Monument," *German History* 18 #2 (2000), 171; Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne au combat* (Paris: Flammarion, 1979).

<sup>30</sup> Michael Dorsch, *French Sculpture Following the Franco-Prussian War: Realist Allegories and the Commemoration of Defeat* (Farnham, Surrey and Burlington, VT: Ashgate 1988), 97.

<sup>31</sup> Jean Quataert, "German Patriotic Women's Work in War and Peacetime, 1864-90," in Förster and Nagler, eds., *On the Road to Total War*, 449-477; also *Staging Philanthropy: Patriotic Women in the National Imagination in Dynastic Germany, 1813-1916* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001).

<sup>32</sup> Rachel Chrastil, *Organizing for War: France, 1870-1914* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2010), 85-89.

<sup>33</sup> Bertrand Taithe, *Defeated Flesh: Medicine, Welfare, and Warfare in the Making of Modern France* (Boulder, CO and New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1989).

<sup>34</sup> Richard J. Evans, "Afterword," in Cole and Unowsky, eds., *The Limits of Loyalty*, 224.

<sup>35</sup> Alon Confino, *The Nation as Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 1871-1918* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 11. See also Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990). For France see Chrastil, *Organizing for War: France, 1870-1914*, 92-3.

<sup>36</sup> Erwin Fink, "Symbolic Representations of the Nation: Baden Bavaria, and Saxony," in H. Collier, Sy-Quia, S. Baeckmann, eds., *Conquering Women: Women and War in the German Cultural Imagination* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 200-219; Daniel L. Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebration in Hapsburg Austria, 1848-1916* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2005).

<sup>37</sup> For Austria-Hungary see Istvan Deak, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Hapsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

<sup>38</sup> Trevor Herbert and Helen Barlow, *Music and the British Military in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1-21, 163-75; Jeffrey Richards, *Imperialism and Music: Britain, 1876-1953* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).

<sup>39</sup> Alison Mathews David, "Decorated Man: Fashioning the French Soldier, 1852-1914," *Fashion Theory* 7 #1, 3-38; Thomas Abler, *Hinterland Warriors: European Empires and Exotic Uniforms* (Oxford: Berg, 1999); John Springhall, "'Up Guards and at Them': British Imperialism and Popular Art, 1880-1914," in John M. Mackenzie, ed., *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 49-72; Paul Usherwood and Jenny Spencer-Smith, *Lady Butler, Battle Artist, 1846-1933* (Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1987); Brosnan, *Visions of War in France*, 57-9.

<sup>40</sup> Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks*, 212.

<sup>41</sup> Herbert and Barlow, *Music and the British Military*, 177-83; W.S. Hamer, *The British Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1885-1905* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 215-217. Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks*, 149-55; John Peck, *War, the Army, and Victorian Literature* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

<sup>42</sup> Penny Summerfield, "Patriotism and Empire: Music Hall Entertainment, 1870-1914," in John Mackenzie, ed., *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, 17-48; Jeffrey Richards, *Imperialism and Music*, 194-269; Dave Russell, *Popular Music in England, 1840-1914: A Social History* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1987). Regina M. Sweeney, *Singing Our Way to Victory: French Cultural Politics and Music During the Great War* (Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University Press, 2001), 1-34.

<sup>43</sup> Edward Berenson, *Heroes of Empire: Five Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Africa* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011); John M. McKenzie, ed., *European Empires and the People: Popular Responses to Imperialism in France, Britain, The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Italy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011)

<sup>44</sup> Paula M. Krebs, *Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 49-62; Graham Dawson, *Soldier heroes: British Adventure, Empire, and the Imagining of Masculinities* (London: Routledge, 1999).

<sup>45</sup> On these topics see generally Robert A. Nye, *Crime, Madness and Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Daniel Pick, *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c1848-c1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Isabel Hull, *The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Amy Kaplan, "Romancing the Empire: The Embodiment of American Masculinity in the Popular Historical Novel of the 1890s," *American Literary History* 2 #4 (Winter, 1990), 659-690.

<sup>46</sup> Christopher Forth, *Masculinity in the Modern West: Gender, Civilization, and the Body* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010).

<sup>47</sup> Paul Crook, *Darwinism, War and History: The Debate over the Biology of War from the 'Origin of Species' to the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 80; Nolan, *The Inverted Mirror*.

<sup>48</sup> Chrastil, *Organizing for War*; Margaret A. Darrow, *French Women and the First World War: War Stories of the Home Front* (New York: Berg, 2000), 30-33; Quataert, *Staging Philanthropy*; Karen Offen, *European Feminisms, 1700-1950: A Political History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

<sup>49</sup> The literature in this field is vast. For some overviews see Richard Holt, J.A. Mangan, Pierre Lanfranchi eds., *European Heroes: Myth, Identity, Sport* (London: Frank Cass, 1996); Pierre Arnaud, *Le Militaire, L'écolier, le gymnaste: naissance de l'éducation physique en France (1869-1889)* (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1991); J.A. Mangan, ed., *Tribal Identities: Nationalism, Europe, Sport* (London: Frank Cass, 1996); Michael Kruger, "Body Culture and Nation-Building: The History of Gymnastics in Germany in the Period of its Foundation as a Nation-State," *International Journal of the History of Sport* 13 #3 (1996), 409-417.

<sup>50</sup> Robert A. Nye, *Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 216-228; Venita Datta, *Heroes and Legends of Fin-de-Siècle France: Gender, Politics, and National Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); John Price, *Everyday Heroism: Victorian Construction of the Heroic Civilian* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013); For philanthropy, Jean Quataert has called these rewards "the world of circulating gifts" in *Staging Philanthropy*, 6, 91, 136-142.